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Abstract
To encourage customers’ referral behavior and expand their customer base, providers of innovative products and services often
use customer referral reward programs (CRPs), though not all CRPs deliver on their initial promise. With one field experiment
and four online experiments, this research investigates the effectiveness of rewarded referrals for recruiting new customers for
more innovative (versus less innovative) offerings and outlines the conditions in which public referral rewards have unintended
ramifications and decrease customers’ referral likelihood. In addition to establishing these effects for more innovative offerings,
this research identifies some moderating consequences, such that the detrimental effect of referral rewards on referral behavior
can be attenuated by not disclosing referral rewards (for recommenders) to referral recipients, increasing the referral reward size,
and rewarding both recommenders and referral recipients. These findings have theoretical and managerial implications.
Keywords Customer referral reward program . Innovative products and services . Reward scheme . Reward size . Reward
visibility . Self-enhancement theory
Successfully launching innovations is important for a firm’s
long-term performance, yet new product failure rates range
from 30% to more than 60% (Castellion and Markham
2013), suggesting the need for effective techniques to launch
innovative products and services (e.g., Bass 1969; Kawakami
and Parry 2013). Positive interpersonal communications, such
as recommendations, should be beneficial (East et al. 2008),
with many firms offering customer referral reward programs
(CRPs) that grant financial incentives to existing customers
making recommendations to potential new customers
(Schmitt et al. 2011). Most CRPs are public in nature, with
both parties aware of the reward. Bluesmart’s CRP rewards
existing customers $20 for successful referrals of new cus-
tomers for their innovative suitcases (Bluesmart Referral
Program 2017), while emphasizing the public nature of their
CRP. Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank (two German banks)
operate ‘public’ CRPs in which the referral recipient provides
the recommender’s contact information and preferred reward
when opening a bank account. Other firms (e.g., Pavlok) send
automated emails to referral recipients to inform them of the
CRP participation conditions and characteristics (e.g., reward
size). Despite the prevalence of such CRPs, theymay not be as
effective as desired. As Intuit CEO, Scott Cook, stated:
BWe’ve tried various artificial stimulants to word of mouth,
like financial incentives to recommenders. None haveworked.
Some produced isolated, but surprising, negative reaction^
(Rosen 2009, p. 202). The potential for negative effects from
reward-induced referrals is possible, but not fully understood
(Wirtz et al. 2013).
A basic economic assumption is that incentives and cus-
tomer motivations to refer or recommend to others are posi-
tively related (Ryu and Feick 2007), but we question this
convention. Instead, for innovative offerings, public rewards
even might diminish customer referrals. As a foundation for
this surprising prediction, we draw on self-enhancement the-
ory (e.g., Sedikides 1993) and posit that for more innovative
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(vs. less) offerings, public rewards undermine customers’mo-
tivation to refer, because this behavior largely reflects their
desire to self-enhance or gain social approval (De Angelis
et al. 2012). Granting referring customers a public reward
undermines this satisfaction and reduces referral likelihood,
consistent with behavioral economics and psychology (e.g.,
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Thus, rewards can be
counterproductive if they conflict with individuals’ moti-
vations or goals (Ariely et al. 2009; Deci et al. 1999).
Prior research has not fully explored this idea relative to
innovative offerings. We propose that the potential nega-
tive effects of a CRP program are contingent on three
boundary conditions: reward visibility (i.e., disclosed to
recipient or not), reward size, and reward scheme (e.g.,
rewards only to recommenders or to both parties).
We test these predictions in a field experiment and four
online experiments, offering several contributions. First, by
examining CRP effects on referral behavior for more innova-
tive offerings (Peres et al. 2010), we enhance understanding as
to the diffusion of these offerings. Extant research establishes
positive interpersonal communications as critical success fac-
tors when launching innovative offerings (Kawakami and
Parry 2013), but as Table 1 indicates, we know little about
how firms’ CRPs actually affect customers and induce diffu-
sion. By showing that public rewards can backfire and de-
crease referrals, disrupting successful launches, we contribute
to the new product diffusion literature (Aral 2011; Kawakami
and Parry 2013).
Second, we add to the CRP effectiveness literature (see
Table 1 for an overview) that focuses on design elements
(e.g., reward type, reward size), brand factors (e.g., brand
strength), and recommender–referral recipients relations
(e.g., tie strength). Jin and Huang (2014), for example, com-
pare monetary and in-kind rewards, showing that the former
increases recommenders’ perceived social costs, making them
less motivating than the latter. Building on prior insights, we
demonstrate that CRP effectiveness also depends on offering
type. For less innovative offerings, public referral rewards can
be productive, while for more innovative offerings, they may
undermine referral motivations. To our knowledge, this is the
first study to investigate how innovativeness of the offering
affects CRP effectiveness.
Third, we also add to research on CRPs’ potential negative
effects.WhileWirtz et al. (2013) show that CRPs can decrease
positive metaperceptions, diminishing referral behavior rela-
tive to natural (unrewarded) behavior, further research is need-
ed into the unintended, potentially negative effects of firms’
customer relationship efforts (Steinhoff and Palmatier 2016).
We complement Wirtz et al.’s (2013) work by illustrating the
detrimental effects of referral rewards on recommenders’ re-
ferral behavior for more innovative offerings.
Fourth, we offer novel insights into the motivational pro-
cesses that drive referrals and how customers’ motivations to
engage in referrals (i.e., need to self-enhance) and extrinsic
rewards (i.e., referral rewards) interact to influence referral
likelihood. Prior research has examined different mechanisms
underlying consumers’ reactions to CRPs, including reward
attractiveness (Orsingher and Wirtz 2018; Stumpf and Baum
2016), perceived social costs (Jin and Huang 2014), and
metaperceptions (Wirtz et al. 2013). Yet no study explores
the interplay of customers’ natural (unrewarded) motivations
with extrinsic rewards (e.g., referral rewards) and their effects
on referral behavior. Thus, previous research fails to acknowl-
edge that the individual positive effects of referral drivers
(e.g., need to self-enhance, financial rewards) may combine
to produce negative effects (Ariely et al. 2009; Bénabou and
Tirole 2006). While related research notes the negative effects
of financial rewards on motivation and behavior in general, it
offers only limited evidence of the underlying psychological
mechanisms (see Table 1). Thus, our detailed analyses of the
process add insights as to the potential negative effects of
incentives in a broader sense.
Fifth, there is a need to examine boundary conditions to
these relationships, with the present research providing evi-
dence that the negative effects relative to more innovative
offerings (1) disappear when the reward is not visible to the
referral recipient, (2) is attenuated with larger rewards, or (3)
can be overcome if both parties receive rewards.
Background: Drivers of customer WOM
and referral behavior
Many studies address questions about what drives word-of-
mouth (WOM) and referral behaviors, defined as Binformal
communications between private parties concerning evalua-
tions of goods and services^ (Anderson 1998, p. 6).1 Most
related research focuses on one of three motives for WOM
and referrals: (1) brand- and product-related drivers, (2) psy-
chological drivers, or (3) financial drivers (see Web Appendix
A for an overview). The brand- and product-related drivers
refer to consumer knowledge of and experiences with a prod-
uct, service, or firm. In a comprehensive meta-analysis, de
Matos and Rossi (2008) identify six common antecedents of
customers’ WOM and referral activities: satisfaction, loyalty,
quality, commitment, trust, and perceived value, while
Sundaram et al. (1998) add product involvement.
In terms of psychological factors, Dichter (1966) notes that
people recommend products and services to fulfill self-
oriented needs or for altruistic purposes. Subsequent studies
confirm and expand this reasoning, indicating that customer
communication can be driven by, for example, self-oriented
motives (e.g., self-enhancement), social bonding (e.g.,
1 In line with the pertinent literature (e.g., Brown et al. 2005), we conceptual-
ize WOM to include recommendations and referral behaviors.
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reducing loneliness) as well as by altruistic motives (e.g., con-
cern for others) (Berger 2014).
Finally, existing research shows that CRPs stimulate refer-
ral behavior (Ryu and Feick 2007), increase existing customer
loyalty to the referred firm (Garnefeld et al. 2013), and en-
hance the economic value of acquired customers (Schmitt
et al. 2011).
While these motivations have distinct effects on referral
behaviors, the interactions of WOM and referral drivers, such
as between psychological (customers’ need to self-enhance)
and financial (rewards) referral drivers, have not been ad-
dressed; although their positive effects may turn negative
when they interact (Ariely et al. 2009). In line with previous
research (Ryu and Feick 2007), we assume that financial re-
wards promise to enhance referrals. However, rewards may
undermine referrals if customers have a goal to present them-
selves favorably to others by recommending innovative
options.
Overview of studies
We conducted one field study and four online experiments
(Table 2). Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual model. With
Study 1, a field experiment with an established German online
shop, we test whether product innovativeness has a positive
effect on consumers’ natural, unrewarded referral likelihood.
We also examine the mediating role of customers’ expecta-
tions about whether they can satisfy their need to self-enhance
and if public referral rewards’ effects on referral likelihood
depend on innovativeness. Study 2 replicates Study 1’s
findings in a service context, while testing two alterna-
tive mediators: intention to help others and perceived
social costs. With a product context, Study 3 examines
if the detrimental effect of rewards on referral likelihood
for more innovative products depends on visibility (pub-
lic vs. private), while Study 4 explores the buffering
effect of increasing reward sizes with the service context
from Study 2. Finally, Study 5 assesses whether reward-
ing both parties (vs. just the recommender) attenuates the
negative effect of rewards on referral likelihood for more
innovative products.
Study 1: Field experiment
In Study 1, we test our basic hypothesis that, due to customers’
expectations of satisfying their self-enhancement needs, inno-
vativeness has a positive effect on referral likelihood. We also
test whether public referral rewards undermine the positive
effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood.Ta
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Self-enhancement drives referrals of innovative
products and services
Self-enhancement theory states that humans desire to view
themselves positively (Swann et al. 1989), with self-
enhancement attempts occurring either privately or publicly
(Sedikides and Gregg 2008). We focus on the public form, in
which people use strategies to self-enhance, such as
displaying abilities or sharing insights about interesting offer-
ings (Berger 2014). In these situations, the overarching goal is
to signal positive traits (Bénabou and Tirole 2006). As viable
tools for public self-enhancement (Alexandrov et al. 2013;
Wojnicki and Godes 2008), referral behavior of innovative
offerings helps consumers present themselves favorably, ful-
filling their self-enhancement needs.
Innovative offerings are novel, unique, and different from
previous offers (Katila and Ahuja 2002). Providing referrals for
novel offerings allows consumers to associate themselves with
these positive attributes, express their uniqueness, gain social
approval and appear helpful (Brown et al. 1988), thus, satisfy-
ing self-enhancement needs by referring innovative offerings.
H1a: Innovativeness positively influences referral likelihood.
H1b: Customers’ expectations that they can satisfy their
need for self-enhancement mediates the positive effect
of innovativeness on referral likelihood, such that in-
novativeness increases their expectations in relation to
their need to self-enhance, which in turn increases their
referral likelihood.
Detrimental effects of public referral rewards
According to principal–agent theory, financial rewards in-
crease motivation by increasing the monetary benefits of
the activity (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972). For exam-
ple, Ryu and Feick (2007) find that offering referral re-
wards increases referral likelihood. However, referral re-
wards can hinder recommenders’ perceptions relative to
their beliefs about how recommendations are viewed by
others (Wirtz et al. 2013).
In line with this notion, behavioral economics and psychol-
ogy research provides compelling evidence that financial re-
wards can decrease motivation to perform behaviors in some
cases (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Financial rewards can
weaken or even reverse the behaviors’ social signals, because
rewards may create doubt about why the person engaged in
the action and decrease both motivation and actual behavior
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).
For more innovative offerings, referral rewards may con-
flict with motivation to self-enhance through referrals. Thus,
with a public reward, individuals may feel that the reward
drove their behavior rather than their motivation to self-en-
hance. This perception likely is inconsistent with their at-
tempts to feel good about themselves or to make positive
impressions on others. Thus, public referral rewards may un-
dermine recommenders’ self-enhancement efforts and de-
crease their referral likelihood for more innovative offerings.
In contrast, less innovative offerings do not invoke the same
self-enhancement motivations, since these referrals are based
on their instrumental value.
H2a: Public referral rewards decrease the positive effect of
innovativeness on referral likelihood.
H2b: Public referral rewards negatively moderate the
mediated effect of innovativeness through cus-
tomers’ expectations to satisfy their need to self-
enhance on referral likelihood by suppressing the
positive effect of innovativeness on customers’ ex-
pected self-enhancement.
Notes:          = Relationship hypothesized;         = Relationship not hypothesized 
Fig. 1 Conceptual model
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Participants, design, and procedure
We conducted a field experiment in collaboration with an
established German online shop that offers a wide range of
products, such as books, watches, clothing, and electronic de-
vices. It provided email addresses for 33,630 customers who
had made purchases in the four weeks before our study. We
randomly selected 10% (n = 3363) and invited them to partic-
ipate in a short survey about their last purchase in an email,
issued by the online shop. The email explained that the online
shop was interested in customer feedback and contained a link
to the survey. Of those invited, 607 responded (18.05%). We
dropped 127 customers (20.9%) who had incomplete re-
sponses (i.e., more than 25% of questions unanswered),
resulting in a sample of 480 (27.5% women, Mage = 48.89).
Participants first indicated the product they had last pur-
chased from the online shop and then answered all questions
with respect to that product. We measured their perceptions of
the innovativeness of the purchased product, their expecta-
tions of satisfying their need to self-enhance, and their product
involvement and product satisfaction. Then, we randomly
assigned participants to the public referral reward or natural
referral (no-reward) condition. In the former, participants read
that the online shop recently launched a CRP and they would
receive a €5 (~$6) referral reward if they recommended the
product to someone who then purchased it. We informed the
participants that referral recipients need to indicate the recom-
menders’ name and e-mail address when purchasing at the
online shop so that recommenders could receive the reward.
We did not include this information in the no-reward
condition.
Measures
Participants indicated their referral likelihood on a scale an-
chored by 0% (Bcertain not to recommend the product^) and
100% (Bcertain to recommend the product^).2 The other mea-
sures relied on multi-item, 7-point, Likert-type scales ranging
from 1 (Bstrongly disagree^) to 7 (Bstrongly agree^). We mea-
sured perceived innovativeness with a three-item scale from
Stock (2011). Participants’ expectations of satisfying their
self-enhancement needs when recommending the product
was measured with three items from Alexandrov et al.
(2013, p. 533), who define this construct as Bthe degree to
which a person expects that projecting a good image to others
can be accomplished by sharing information about brands.^
Product involvement (four items, Beatty and Talpade 1994)
and satisfaction with the purchased product (three items, De
Wulf et al. 2001) served as covariates in our analyses. Product
involvement reflects consumers’ enduring perceptions of the
importance of a product category, according to their inherent
needs and interests (Mittal 1995); we used it to assess the
personal relevance of the purchased product. The confirmato-
ry factor analysis revealed acceptable fit with the data: χ2/df =
2.32, confirmatory fit index = .98, goodness-of-fit index = .96,
and root mean error of approximation = .05. The composite
reliability values ranged from .83 to .96, above the recom-
mended threshold of .7 (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). Items for all
five studies and their reliabilities appear in the Appendix. We
adopted procedural remedies to minimize common method
variance (Hulland et al. 2018; see Web Appendix B for
detailed descriptions of the procedural remedies). A native
English speaker, raised bilingually in Germany, translated
the measures (for all studies) to German. A bilingual native
speaker of German then translated the measures back into
English (Douglas and Craig 2007). To check the referral re-
ward manipulation, we asked participants to indicate whether
the online shop offered a referral reward (no or yes). All par-
ticipants answered correctly.
Results
Table 3 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics for
the independent variable, the mediator variable, the outcome
variable, and the covariates. We conducted a moderated me-
diation analysis (Hayes 2013; Model 8, with the moderator
located between the independent variable and the mediator, as
well as between the independent variable and the dependent
variable; bootstrapped with 5000 draws), with innovativeness
as the independent variable, referral reward (0 = no reward;
1 = public referral reward) as moderator, expected self-
enhancement as mediator, and referral likelihood as the depen-
dent variable (Fig. 1). Product involvement and product satis-
faction served as covariates. The regression models predicting
customers’ expectations of satisfying self-enhancement needs
(R2 = .30) and referral likelihood (R2 = .33) both explain sig-
nificant variance in the outcome variable (see Table 4).
For the direct effect of innovativeness on referral likeli-
hood, contingent on the public referral reward, results are
consistent with predictions that innovativeness positively af-
fects referral likelihood in the absence of a referral reward
2 In this research domain, the term Brecommend^ typically applies consumers
who refer a product to someone else, whether for a reward or not (see Jin and
Huang 2014; Ryu and Feick 2007).
Table 3 Means, standard deviations, and correlations, Study 1
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4
1. Product innovativeness 4.22 1.58
2. Expected self-enhancement 4.12 1.53 .41**
3. Referral likelihood 63.14 26.02 .27** .50**
4. Product involvement 4.97 1.27 .47** .45** .33**
5. Satisfaction 5.83 1.42 .38** .34** .24** .65**
** p < .01
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.
(H1a), while a public reward decreases the effect of innova-
tiveness on referral likelihood (H2a), noting the interaction of
innovativeness and referral reward on referral likelihood (b =
−8.73, SE = 1.27, p < .001, 95% confidence interval
[CI] = [−11.23, −6.23]). In support of H1a, the conditional
direct effects show that innovativeness positively influ-
ences referral likelihood when there is no reward (b =
5.09, SE = .98, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.17, 7.01]; Table 4),
while consistent with H2a, the effect of innovativeness on
referral likelihood is negative with a public reward (vs.
no - reward) (b = −3 .63 , SE = .96 , p < .001 , 95%
CI = [−5.52, −1.75]; see Figure W1 in Web Appendix C
for a simple slope analysis of innovativeness at one stan-
dard deviation below and above the mean score in the no
reward and the public reward conditions).
Next, we examine the indirect effects of innovativeness
through expected self-enhancement on referral likelihood,
contingent on a public referral reward (H1b and H2b). The
significant index of moderated mediation (b = −2.26,
SE = .63, 95% CI = [−3.58, −1.11]) indicates that the reward
moderates the indirect effect. Supporting H1b, expectations of
satisfying self-enhancement mediate the effect of innovative-
ness on referral likelihood in the no-reward condition (b =
2.55, SE = .52, 95% CI = [1.63, 3.64]). In the no-reward con-
dition, innovativeness positively influences customer expec-
tations (b = .39, SE = .06, p < .001, 95% CI = [.29, .51]) and
self-enhancement positively affects referral likelihood (b =
6.41, SE = .76, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.92, 7.91]; Table 4).
Taken with the positive direct effect of innovativeness on re-
ferral likelihood in the no-reward condition, partial mediation
is indicated, supporting H1b. However, self-enhancement
does not mediate the effect of innovativeness on referral like-
lihood with a public reward (b = .28, SE = .45, 95%
CI = [−.57, 1.20]). Consistent with H2b, public referral re-
wards suppress the positive effect of innovativeness on ex-
pected self-enhancement (b = .04, SE = .06, p > .05, 95%
CI = [−.07, .16]).
Discussion
The results from this field study elucidate the differential ef-
fects of public referral rewards on referral likelihood and re-
veal important insights about their effectiveness. Thus, Study
1 provides initial evidence for the counterintuitive, surprising
effect of public referral rewards on referral likelihood for more
innovative offerings. As expected, the results also reveal that
customers’ expectations of satisfying their need for self-
enhancement underlie the positive effect of innovativeness
on referral behavior. However, a public referral reward under-
mines self-enhancement and decreases referral likelihood. To
explore these detrimental effects and replicate findings in a
service context, we examine the underlying mechanisms in
more detail in the next experiment.
Table 4 Moderated mediation results, Study 1
Consequences
Expected self-enhancement (ES) Referral likelihood (RL)
Antecedents Coefficient SE p 95% CI Coefficient SE p 95% CI
Product innovativeness (PI) .39 .06 < .001 [.29, .51] 5.09 .98 < .001 [3.17, 7.01]
Expected self-enhancement (ES) – – – – 6.41 .76 < .001 [4.92, 7.91]
Public referral reward 1.09 .34 < .01 [.43, 1.75] 38.17 5.65 < .001 [27.07, 49.28]
PI × Public referral reward −.35 .08 < .001 [−.50, −.21] −8.73 1.27 < .001 [−11.23, −6.23]
Product involvement .36 .06 < .001 [.23, .48] 2.41 1.10 < .05 [.24, 4.57]
Satisfaction .06 .05 > .05 [−.05, .17] .42 .91 > .05 [−1.36, 2.20]
R2 = .30
F (5, 474) = 40.75, p < .001
R2 = .33
F (6, 473) = 39.70, p < .001
Conditional direct effects of PI at values of the reward
Public referral reward Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI
No reward .39 .06 < .001 [.29, .51] 5.09 .98 < .001 [3.17, 7.01]
Public reward .04 .06 > .05 [−.07, .16] −3.63 .96 < .001 [−5.52, −1.75]
Conditional indirect effects of PI via ES on RL at values of the reward
Public referral reward Coefficient Boot SE 95% CI
No reward 2.55 .52 [1.63, 3.64]
Public reward .28 .45 [−.57, 1.20]
Index of moderated mediation −2.26 .63 [−3.58, −1.11]
Coefficient = unstandardized regression coefficients
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Study 2: Testing alternative mediators
With Study 2, we pursue three objectives. First, we attempt to
replicate the field study in a more controlled setting to increase
confidence in our findings. Second, Study 2 can increase the
generalizability of our Study 1 findings, because we use a
service context instead of a product context. The intangible,
experiential nature of services makes referral behavior even
more important for customer acquisition, especially of a new
innovative service (Bansal and Voyer 2000). Customer refer-
rals reduce the perceived risk associated with service con-
sumption for new customers (Murray and Schlacter 1990)
and may facilitate recommenders’ self-enhancement
needs. Third, Study 2 incorporates customers’ intention
to help others by making a recommendation and the social
costs’ perceptions of rewarded recommendations as inter-
vening variables, so as to consider alternative mechanisms
that might explain the negative effect of rewards with
more innovative offerings.
Intentions to help and perceived social costs
as alternative mediators
Many consumers engage in referral behavior for altruistic rea-
sons, that is, to help others make good purchase decisions
(Dichter 1966). Through interviews, Sundaram et al. (1998)
find that more than 20% of WOM and referral conversations
are motivated by a desire to help others avoid problems or
make better purchases, while Teichmann et al. (2015) showed
that altruism drives consumers’ contributions to online com-
munities. Similarly, customers may offer recommendations
for more innovative offerings to help others make better pur-
chase decisions.
Additionally, rewarding referral behavior increases the per-
ceived social costs of making referrals, due to doubt about the
recommender’s motives (Ryu and Feick 2007). As Jin and
Huang (2014) show, increased social costs can explain why
monetary rewards are less effective for stimulating customers’
referral behavior than in-kind rewards. Accordingly, the det-
rimental effect of referral rewards with more innovative offer-
ings may be due to increased social costs.
Participants, design, and procedure
Study 2 uses a 2 (service innovativeness: less innovative vs.
more innovative) × 2 (public referral reward: no reward vs.
public reward) between-subjects design. A total of 230 partic-
ipants (58.3% women,Mage = 30.7 years) were recruited from
a Germanmarket research firm’s professionally hosted nation-
al online panel. Participants, who received monetary incen-
tives from the panel provider, were randomly assigned to con-
ditions. The invitation to participate in the study directed them
to a website containing the online experiment. For the service
setting, participants responded to a recommendation for a
gym. The offerings in our studies are incremental innovations,
such that they provide new features, benefits or improvements
in an existing market (Garcia and Calantone 2002). We used a
fictitious brand (Active Gym), which does not resemble any
existing brand. Participants were asked to imagine they had
joined a new gym a few weeks ago, with a monthly member-
ship fee of €50 (~$60).
Next, we manipulated innovativeness, such that we de-
scribed the more innovative gym as sustainable (Nidumolu
et al. 2009), offering a high level of sustainable fitness to save
the environment and burn calories at the same time by using
energy-producing equipment that generates renewable energy.
In contrast, in the less innovative service condition, the de-
scription noted a more conventional gym (e.g., with top-of-
the-line equipment including weight machines; see Web
Appendix D for more detailed descriptions of the experimen-
tal manipulations).
A pretest (N = 51; 54.9% women; Mage = 25.6 years) indi-
cated that participants in the more innovative condition per-
ceived the gym as more innovative (Mmoreinnovative = 5.78;
Mlessinnovative = 4.04; t(49) = −5.69, p < .001) according to a
three-item scale from Stock (2011) and expected greater sat-
isfaction of self-enhancement needs (Mmoreinnovative = 5.53;
Mlessinnovative = 4.43; t(49) = −5.74, p < .001) on a three-item
scale from Alexandrov et al. (2013) than participants in the
less innovative condition. Participants read that they had vis-
ited the gym several times and were very satisfied with the
service and equipment. In the reward condition, they read that
on a recent visit to the gym an employee explained that the
gym had developed a CRP and members would receive a
€5 (~$6) referral reward for each member they helped
acquire; the referral recipient would need to provide the
recommender’s name and email address upon joining the
gym. This information was not included in the no-reward
condition. The referral reward size was relative to the
monthly membership fee, equivalent to 10% of the
monthly fee (Ryu and Feick 2007).
Measures
Participants indicated their referral likelihood on a 100-point
scale (0% = Bcertain not to recommend the gym^; 100% =
Bcertain to recommend the gym^). As in Study 1, we mea-
sured participants’ expectations of satisfying self-
enhancement needs and product involvement. With the
three-item scale from Stock (2011), we checked the innova-
tiveness manipulation. We measured customers’ intention to
help others with three items fromAlexandrov et al. (2013) and
their perceived social costs with five items from Jin and
Huang (2014). In addition, we included a three-item CRP
proneness scale from Lichtenstein et al. (1990), which served
as a covariate. The CRP proneness measure describes a
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general tendency to participate in CRPs. We also asked par-
ticipants whether the firm offered a referral reward. Two real-
ism checks (Darley and Lim 1993) affirmed the realism of our
setting (M = 5.20, SD = 1.35).
Results
Manipulation checks The manipulations of innovativeness
and the referral reward were successful (see Web Appendix
E for detailed manipulation checks).
Hypotheses tests We conducted a moderated mediation
analysis (Hayes 2013; Model 8; bootstrapped with 5000
draws), with innovativeness (0 = less innovative; 1 = more
innovative) as the independent variable; referral reward
(0 = no reward; 1 = public reward) as a moderator, expect-
ed self-enhancement, customers’ intention to help others,
and perceived social costs as mediator variables, and re-
ferral likelihood as the dependent variable. Product in-
volvement and CRP proneness served as covariates.
Table 5 shows the results of the moderated mediation
model and the effects of innovativeness on referral likeli-
hood through the three mediator variables. The regression
models predicting expectations of satisfying self-
enhancement needs (R2 = .35), intention to help others
(R2 = .27), perceived social costs (R2 = .12), and referral
likelihood (R2 = .32) explain significant variance in the
outcome variable.
As in Study 1, we first examine the direct effect of inno-
vativeness on referral likelihood, contingent on the public
referral reward (H1a and H2a). Consistent with our predic-
tions, we find a two-way interaction effect of innovativeness
and the reward on referral likelihood (b = −27.06, SE = 6.11,
p < .001, 95% CI = [−39.09, −15.02]; Table 5). The condi-
tional direct effects reveal that innovativeness positively af-
fects referral likelihood in the absence of a reward (b =
17.46, SE = 4.48, p < .001, 95% CI = [8.63, 26.28]), in sup-
port of H1a. Participants’ natural, unrewarded referral likeli-
hood is higher in the more versus less innovative service
condition (Mmoreinnovative = 80.04; Mlessinnovative = 58.86;
t(105) = −5.03, p < .001; see Figure W2 in Web Appendix
C). In support of H2a, there is a negative direct effect of
innovativeness on referral likelihood in the public reward
condition (b = −9.59, SE = 4.10, p < .05, 95% CI = [−17.68,
−1.52]). The cell means reveal that introducing a public
referral reward for a more innovative service decreases re-
ferral likelihood (vs. no reward) (Mnoreward = 80.04;
Mpublicreward = 62.20; t(105.54) = 3.68, p < .001), while doing
so for a less innovative service increases referral likelihood
(vs. no reward) (Mnoreward = 58.86; Mpublicreward = 74.37;
t(112) = −3.38, p < .001).
Next, we examined the indirect effects of innovative-
ness through expected self-enhancement on referral
likelihood, contingent on the public referral reward (H1b
and H2b). The significant index of moderated mediation
(b = −5.67, SE = 2.97, 95% CI = [−12.54, −1.12]) indicates
that the indirect effect of innovativeness through expected
self-enhancement on referral likelihood is moderated by
the reward. Supporting H1b, expectations of satisfying
self-enhancement mediate the effect of innovativeness on
referral likelihood in a no-reward case (b = 4.75, SE =
1.98, 95% CI = [1.53, 9.18]). With no reward, innovative-
ness positively influences expected satisfaction of self-
enhancement (b = .72, SE = .23, p < .01, 95% CI = [.27,
1.17]), which then positively influences referral likelihood
(b = 6.59, SE = 1.36, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.91, 9.26], indi-
cating partial mediation. As predicted in H2b, expected
self-enhancement does not mediate the effect of innova-
tiveness on referral likelihood in the public reward condi-
tion (b = −.93, SE = 1.65, 95% CI = [−4.91, 1.57]; see
Table 5); the public referral reward suppresses the positive
effect of innovativeness on expected self-enhancement
(b = −.14, SE = .21, p > .05, 95% CI = [−.56, .28]).
The tests of the two alternative mediators (intention to help
others and perceived social costs) in our moderated mediation
model reveal that offering a reward decreases customers’ in-
tention to help others (b = −.40, SE = .20, p < .05, 95%
CI = [−.80, −.01]) and increases perceived social costs
(b = .94, SE = .25, p < .001, 95% CI = [.45, 1.43]; see
Table 5). In line with previous research (Jin and Huang
2014), perceived social costs also negatively affect referral
likelihood (b = −2.86, SE = 1.19, p < .05, 95% CI = [−5.21,
−.52]). However, the conditional indirect effects indicate that
neither intentions to help (b = .06, SE = .59, 95% CI = [−1.41,
1.18]) nor perceived social costs (b = .09, SE = 1.07, 95%
CI = [−2.39, 2.21]) mediate the effect of innovativeness on
referral likelihood.
Discussion
Using an online experiment, Study 2 replicates Study 1 in
a service context. We again identify a negative effect of
public referral rewards on referral likelihood with more
innovative offerings. For more innovative services, cus-
tomers exhibit high natural, unrewarded referral likeli-
hood, but when offered a reward, their referral likelihood
decreases. For less innovative services though, public re-
ferral rewards trigger a standard economic reward effect
that increases participants’ referral likelihood compared
with the no-reward condition. Study 2 also rules out the
alternative mediators, providing additional support for
self-enhancement as the underlying mechanism. Studies
1 and 2 together provide strong support for our theoretical
predictions, revealing important insights about the nega-
tive effects of public rewards on referral likelihood for
more innovative offerings. Further, the direct effect of
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the public referral reward on referral likelihood is stronger
in Study 1, possibly due to the greater realism of the field
experiment.
Study 3: Moderating role of reward visibility
In Study 3, we investigate whether reward visibility (public
vs. private) affects the negative effect of rewards on referral
behavior with more innovative offerings. In most CRPs, the
referral reward is visible to both the recommender and the
referral recipient (public condition), yet some programs hide
this information (private condition). Study 3 tests whether
firms can mitigate the negative effect of referral rewards by
not disclosing the reward to referral recipients.
Public versus private referral rewards
The detrimental effect of referral rewards for more innovative
offerings identified in Studies 1 and 2 is likely a consequence
of the conflict between a public referral reward and the rec-
ommender’s attempt to make positive impressions on others.
In situations in which people are driven (partly) by others’
perceptions, it is crucial to specify whether their motivation
and actions are visible to others. In field experiments, Ariely
et al. (2009) and Ashraf et al. (2014), for example, find that
monetary incentives have neutral or negative effects on
prosocial behavior in public settings but positive effects in
private settings.
Thus, referral reward visibility is an important boundary
condition of the proposed effects. That is, rewards may
Table 5 Moderated mediation results, Study 2
Consequences
Expected self-enhancement
(ES)
Intention to help (IH) Perceived social
costs (PSC)
Referral likelihood (RL)
Antecedents Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p
Service innovativeness (SI) .72 .23 < .01 .02 .21 > .05 .19 .25 > .05 17.46 4.48 < .001
Expected self-enhancement (ES) – – – – – – – – – 6.59 1.36 < .001
Intention to help (IH) – – – – – – – – – .36 .25 > .05
Perceived social costs (PSC) – – – – – – – – – −2.86 1.19 < .05
Public referral reward −.07 .22 > .05 −.40 .20 < .05 .94 .25 < .001 19.89 4.42 < .001
SI × Public referral reward −.86 .31 < .01 .17 .28 > .05 −.03 .35 > .05 −27.06 6.11 < .001
Product involvement .18 .06 < .01 .14 .06 < .05 −.09 .07 > .05 .31 1.24 > .05
CRP proneness .42 .06 < .001 .34 .06 < .001 .06 .07 > .05 1.86 1.38 > .05
R2 = .35
F (5, 223) = 23.98, p < .001
R2 = .27
F (5, 223) = 16.18, p < .001
R2 = .12
F (5, 223) = 6.07, p < .001
R2 = .32
F (8, 220) = 12.69, p < .001
Conditional direct effects of SI at values of the reward
Public Referral reward Coefficient SE P Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p
No reward .72 .23 < .01 -* – – -* – – 17.46 4.48 < .001
Public reward −.14 .21 > .05 – – – – – – −9.59 4.10 < .05
Conditional indirect effects of SI via ES, IH and PSC on referral likelihood at values of the reward
SI➔ ES➔ RL Coefficient Boot SE 95% CI
No reward 4.75 1.98 [1.53, 9.18]
Public reward −.93 1.65 [−4.91, 1.57]
Index of moderated mediation −5.67 2.97 [−12.54, −1.12]
SI➔ IH➔ RL
No reward .01 .36 [−.73, .79]
Public reward .07 .49 [−1.18, 1.00]
Index of moderated mediation .06 .59 [−1.41, 1.18]
SI➔ PSC➔ RL
No reward −.54 .73 [−2.27, .70]
Public reward −.45 .90 [−2.68, .97]
Index of moderated mediation .09 1.07 [−2.39, 2.21]
Coefficient = unstandardized regression coefficients
*The conditional direct effects of service innovativeness at the values of the reward on intention to help and perceived social costs are not calculated in
the Process macro, because the interaction effects of service innovativeness and the referral reward on intention to help and perceived social costs are not
significant
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undermine recommenders’ need to present themselves favor-
ably to others only if they are visible to the recipient (public
condition). If the reward is not disclosed to the recipient, it
may not undermine recommenders’ self-enhancement needs
or referral behavior (private condition).
H3a: With a private (vs. public) referral reward, the negative
effect of the reward on the effect of innovativeness on
referral likelihood is attenuated.
H3b: With a private (vs. public) referral reward, the negative
effect of the reward on the mediated effect of innova-
tiveness through expected self-enhancement on refer-
ral likelihood is attenuated.
Participants, design, and procedure
Study 3 uses a 3 (referral reward: no vs. public vs. private) ×
2 (product innovativeness: less vs. more) between-subjects
design. As in Study 2, we recruited participants from a
German market research firm’s hosted national online panel.
In total, 325 participants (62.2% women, Mage = 30.3 years)
took part and were randomly assigned to the conditions. We
used suitcases as the product category. The use of CRPs is
widespread among firms selling suitcases, and most people
are familiar with suitcases, so they can readily identify more
innovative product characteristics. We developed a fictitious
brand (Smart Trolley) to avoid any influence of prior brand
beliefs, with no resemblance to any existing brand.
Participants imagined that they had bought a new suitcase
for €200 (~$240) a few weeks ago. As in prior research
(Truong et al. 2017), participants read descriptions of suit-
cases that varied in innovativeness. In the more innovative
condition, the suitcase had various innovative features (e.g.,
integrated GPS and 3G technology). In the less innovative
product condition, participants read a description of a suit-
case with standard equipment (see Web Appendix D for
more detailed descriptions of the experimental manipu-
lations). A pretest (N = 57; 45.60% women; Mage =
25.42 years) indicated that participants in the more innova-
tive product condition perceived the suitcase as more inno-
vative (Mmoreinnovative = 5.81; Mlessinnovative = 4.08; t(42.41) =
−5.38, p < .001) according to a three-item scale from Stock
(2011). They also expressed greater expected satisfaction of
self-enhancement needs than participants in the less innova-
tive condition (Mmoreinnovative = 4.02; Mlessinnovative = 2.96;
t(55) = −2.59, p < .05) on a three-item scale from
Alexandrov et al. (2013). In both the public and private
reward conditions, participants read that Smart Trolley sent
them an email, announcing the launch of a CRP. If they
recommended the product to someone who then purchased
a Smart Trolley suitcase, the firm would pay them €30
(~$36). In the public reward condition, participants read that
the referral recipient would need to provide the recom-
mender’s name and email address when purchasing for the
recommender to receive the reward. In the private reward
condition, participants instead read that the recommender
would need to provide the referral recipient’s name and
email address but Smart Trolley would not disclose the re-
ward to the recipient. We did not include this information in
the no-reward condition. The reward sizes are at a medium
level, equivalent to 15% of the selling price.
Measures
Participants indicated their referral likelihood on a 100-point
scale (0% = Bcertain not to recommend the suitcase^; 100% =
Bcertain to recommend the suitcase^). As in Study 2, we
measured expectations of satisfying self-enhancement needs,
product involvement, and CRP proneness. The same three-
item scale (Stock 2011) served to check the manipulation of
innovativeness. In addition, we asked participants whether
the firm offered a referral reward. To check the reward visi-
bility manipulation, we asked participants to indicate whether
the recipient knew that a referral reward was paid to the
recommender. Two realism checks (Darley and Lim 1993)
affirmed the realism of our experimental setting (M = 5.06,
SD = 1.50).
Results
Manipulation checks The manipulation of innovativeness was
successful. However, two participants who answered incor-
rectly relative to the visibility of the reward were excluded,
with a final sample of 323 (see Web Appendix E for detailed
manipulation checks).
Hypotheses tests To test H3a and b, we conducted a moder-
ated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013; Model 8; bootstrapped
with 5000 draws), with innovativeness (0 = less innovative;
1 =more innovative) as the independent variable, referral re-
ward (0 = no reward; 1 = public reward; 2 = private reward)
as a moderator, expected self-enhancement as a mediator,
referral likelihood as the dependent variable, and product in-
volvement and CRP proneness as covariates. Because the
moderator is a multi-categorical variable with three condi-
tions, we created two dummy variables for the analyses.
Dummy 1 reflects the difference between the public reward
and no-reward conditions; Dummy 2 refers to the difference
between the private reward and no-reward conditions. The
no-reward condition thus serves as the reference category.
Table 6 contains the results of the moderated mediation
model.
Corroborating Studies 1 and 2, and in support of H1a, we
find a positive direct effect of innovativeness on referral like-
lihood when no reward is offered (b = 11.53, SE = 5.34,
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p < .05, 95% CI = [1.03, 22.04]). The results also reveal a
negative direct effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood
in the public reward condition, such that the effect of innova-
tiveness on referral likelihood decreases relative to the no-
reward condition (b = −15.72, SE = 4.33, p < .001, 95%
CI = [−24.24, −7.21]; Table 6). However, the effect of inno-
vativeness on referral likelihood is not significant for a private
referral reward; that is, the effect of innovativeness does not
differ from that in the no-reward condition (b = −4.29, SE =
4.46, p > .05, 95% CI = [−13.07, 4.49]). Offering a public re-
ferral reward with more innovative products decreases referral
likelihood compared with the no-reward condition
(Mnoreward = 81.17; Mpublicreward = 58.70; t(84.61) = 4.15,
p < .001), but with a private referral reward, participants’ re-
ferral likelihood is higher than in the public reward condition
(Mpublicreward = 58.70; Mprivatereward = 73.41; t(98.80) = −2.53,
p < .05) and not lower than in the no-reward condition
(Mnoreward = 81.17; Mprivatereward = 73.41; t(112) = 1.89,
p > .05; see Figure W3 in Web Appendix C). Thus, the
negative effect of referral rewards is attenuated by private
referral rewards, in support of H3a. However, we find no
difference between public and private rewards for less
innovative products (Mpublicreward = 74.41; Mprivatereward =
75.68; t(114) = −.29, p > .05).
Regarding the indirect effect of innovativeness through
expected self-enhancement on referral likelihood, contin-
gent on the three reward conditions, Table 6 indicates the
indices of the moderated mediation, reflecting the differ-
ences across the conditional indirect effects. Dummy 1
contrasts the indirect effect in the public reward condition
to the indirect effect in the no-reward condition, and
Dummy 2 compares the indirect effect in the private re-
ward condition to the indirect effect in the no-reward con-
dition. The moderated mediation indices reveal that the
indirect effects in the public reward condition (b = −6.79,
SE = 2.39, 95% CI = [−12.07, −2.73]) and private reward
Table 6 Moderated mediation results, Study 3
Consequences
Expected self-enhancement (ES) Referral likelihood (RL)
Antecedents Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI
Product innovativeness (PI) 1.60 .25 < .001 [.69, 1.78] 11.53 5.34 < .05 [1.03, 22.04]
Expected self-enhancement (ES) – – – – 5.02 1.12 < .001 [2.82, 7.22]
Referral reward – – – – – – – –
Dummy 1 (public vs. no reward) .37 .25 > .05 [−.12, .87] 13.07 5.01 < .01 [3.22, 22.93]
Dummy 2 (private vs. no reward) .55 .25 < .05 [.06, 1.05] 13.84 5.04 < .01 [3.93, 23.75]
PI × Referral reward – – – – – – – –
PI × Dummy 1 −1.35 .34 < .001 [−2.02, −.69] −27.26 6.84 < .001 [−40.72, −13.79]
PI × Dummy 2 −.81 .34 < .05 [−1.48, −.14] −15.82 6.78 < .05 [−29.16, −2.49]
Product involvement .06 .07 > .05 [−.07, .19] .97 1.31 > .05 [−1.60, 3.54]
CRP proneness .46 .06 < .001 [.35, .57] 3.74 1.23 < .01 [1.32, 6.17]
R2 = .41
F (7, 314) = 30.89, p < .001
R2 = .29
F (8, 313) = 16.08, p < .001
Conditional direct effects of PI at values of the reward
Referral reward Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI
No reward 1.60 .25 < .001 [1.10, 2.10] 11.53 5.34 < .05 [1.03, 22.04]
Public reward .25 .22 > .05 [−.18, .68] −15.72 4.33 < .001 [−24.24, −7.21]
Private reward .79 .22 < .001 [.36, 1.23] −4.29 4.46 >.05 [−13.07, 4.49]
Conditional indirect effects of PI via ES on RL at values of the reward
Referral reward Coefficient Boot SE 95% CI
No reward 8.05 2.33 [3.70, 12.01]
Public reward 1.26 1.18 [−.92, 3.83]
Private reward 3.99 1.67 [1.20, 7.71]
Index of moderated mediation
Dummy 1 (public vs. no reward) −6.79 2.39 [−12.07, −2.73]
Dummy 2 (private vs. no reward) −4.06 1.87 [−8.52, −1.14]
Coefficient = unstandardized regression coefficients; Dummy 1 reflects the difference between the public reward and no-reward conditions; Dummy 2
reflects the difference between the private reward and no-reward conditions
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condition (b = −4.06, SE = 1.87, 95% CI = [−8.52, −1.14])
decrease relative to those in the no-reward condition.
As in Studies 1 and 2, expectations of satisfying self-
enhancement needs mediates the effect of innovativeness
on referral likelihood when no reward is offered (b = 8.05,
SE = 2.33, 95% CI = [3.70, 12.01]), in support of H1b. In the
absence of a reward, innovativeness positively affects expec-
tations of satisfying this need (b = 1.60, SE = .25, p < .001,
95% CI = [.69, 1.78]), which then positively affects referral
likelihood (b = 11.53, SE = 5.34, p < .05, 95% CI = [1.03,
22.04]), indicating partial mediation. Expected self-
enhancement does not mediate the effect of innovativeness
on referral likelihood in the public referral reward condition
(b = 1.26, SE = 1.18, 95% CI = [−.92, 3.83]); the public re-
ferral reward suppresses the positive effect of innovative-
ness on expected self-enhancement (b = .25, SE = .22,
p > .05, 95% CI = [−.18, .68]). However, in support of
H3b and consistent with our reasoning that not disclos-
ing the reward to the referral recipient allows recom-
menders to satisfy self-enhancement needs, innovative-
ness positively affects expected self-enhancement
(b = .79, SE = .22, p < .05, 95% CI = [.36, 1.23]) and ex-
pected self-enhancement mediates the effect of innova-
tiveness on referral likelihood in the private reward con-
dition (b = 3.99, SE = 1.67, 95% CI = [1.20, 7.71];
Table 6).
Discussion
These results provide further support for the proposed
effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood via expect-
ed self-enhancement, as well as for the detrimental effect
of public referral rewards with more innovative offerings.
Moreover, Study 3 examines an important boundary con-
dition of the proposed negative effect of referral rewards:
Private referral rewards, which are not disclosed to the
referral recipient, enable recommenders to achieve self-
enhancement while attenuating the negative effect of the
reward on referral likelihood. Thus, Study 3 findings pro-
vide additional support that customers’ expectations of
satisfying the need to self-enhance explains the detrimen-
tal effect of referral rewards for more innovative
offerings.
Study 4: Mitigating role of referral reward size
Study 4 examines referral reward size as another bound-
ary condition. When the size of the referral reward in-
creases, its economic benefits may offset recommenders’
decreasing motivation to refer more innovative offerings,
and it likely reinforces the positive effects on referral
likelihood for less innovative services.
Increasing referral reward size
The negative effect of financial rewards on customers’ moti-
vation and behavior may depend on the reward amount. That
is, the motivating effect of large rewards tends to be greater
than the loss of customers’ initial motivation to self-enhance,
as induced by the financial reward (Gneezy 2005), with a
monotonic, increasing relationship between financial rewards
for an activity and motivation expected (Prendergast 1999).
Accordingly, larger public referral rewards may mitigate
the negative effects on referral likelihood for more innovative
offerings, while relatively small public rewards should de-
crease referral likelihood compared with the no-reward condi-
tion, because small referral rewards cannot compensate for the
loss of satisfying self-enhancement needs. Meanwhile, larger
public referral rewards may offset this effect and increase re-
ferral likelihood, compared with smaller rewards.
H4: Increasing referral reward size attenuates the negative
effect of public referral rewards on the effect of innova-
tiveness on referral likelihood.
Participants, design, and procedure
To test H4, we use a 3 (public referral reward: no reward vs.
small reward vs. large reward) × 2 (service innovativeness:
less vs. more) between-subjects design. A total of 305 partic-
ipants (50.8% women, Mage = 27.7 years) were recruited,
using the method suggested by López-López et al. (2014),
and randomly assigned to the conditions. Research assistants
approached people on the street and in large shopping malls in
a major German city and asked them to participate in a re-
search study, at different times and days over a ten-day period.
Those who agreed to participate were given a link to the online
study and asked to answer the online questionnaire in the next
two days. In total, 51.8% of the people who verbally agreed to
participate actually participated in the online study. As an
incentive, participants could enter a raffle, in which 1 of every
25 participants could win a €25 (~$30) Amazon voucher.
We employed the service scenario, with the same ficti-
tious brand (Active Gym) and service innovativeness ma-
nipulation, from Study 2, but added a reward size manip-
ulation (no reward vs. small reward vs. large reward). For
the reward size manipulation, we noted that, on a recent
visit to the gym, a service employee explained that the gym
had developed a CRP in which members would receive
either a €5 (low) or €50 (high) referral reward for every
new member they helped acquire and that the referral re-
cipient would need to provide the recommender’s name
and email address when becoming a new member of the
gym. We did not include this information in the no-reward
condition. The determination of the reward size again was
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relative to the monthly membership fee, such that the small
reward was 10% and the large reward was 100% of the
monthly fee (Ryu and Feick 2007).
Measures
Participants indicated their referral likelihood on a 100-point
scale (0% = Bcertain not to recommend the gym^; 100% =
Bcertain to recommend the gym^). We again measured partic-
ipants’ expectations of satisfying their self-enhancement
needs, product involvement, and CRP proneness. The same
three-item scale (Stock 2011) served to check the manipula-
tion of innovativeness. In addition, we included a two-item
scale from Ryu and Feick (2007) to check the manipulation of
reward size (see Appendix). Two realism checks (Darley and
Lim 1993) affirmed the realism of our experimental setting
(M = 5.08, SD = 1.27).
Results
Manipulation checks The manipulations of service innova-
tiveness and referral reward size were successful (see Web
Appendix E for detailed manipulation checks).
Hypotheses tests The moderated mediation analysis (Hayes
2013; Model 8; bootstrapped with 5000 draws) included
innovativeness (0 = less innovative; 1 = more innovative)
as the independent variable, public referral reward (0 = no
reward; 1 = small reward; 2 = large reward) as a modera-
tor, expected self-enhancement as a mediator, referral
likelihood as the dependent variable, and product involve-
ment and CRP proneness as covariates. As in Study 3, we
created two dummy variables, with Dummy 1 contrasting
the small reward and no-reward conditions, and Dummy 2
comparing the large reward and no-reward conditions.
The no-reward condition serves as the reference category.
Table 7 contains the results of the moderated mediation
model.
We find a positive direct effect of innovativeness on referral
likelihood when no reward is offered (b = 11.59, SE = 3.84,
p < .01, 95% CI = [4.05, 19.15]), in support of H1a. The re-
sults also reveal negative direct effects of innovativeness on
referral likelihood in the small public reward (b = −19.82,
SE = 3.58, p < .001, 95% CI = [−26.87, −12.77]) and in the
large public reward (b = −10.33, SE = 3.28, p < .01, 95%
CI = [−16.79, −3.88]; Table 7) conditions; in both these con-
ditions, the effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood de-
creases relative to the no-reward condition. To analyze the
innovativeness–reward size interaction in more detail, we ex-
amined the effects of public referral rewards on referral like-
lihood for more versus less innovative conditions separately.
Introducing a small public referral reward (€5) in the more
innovative condition decreases referral likelihood
(Mnoreward = 81.64; Msmallreward = 51.23; t(111.69) = 9.53,
p < .001), while raising the reward size to €50 increases refer-
ral likelihood relative to the small reward condition
(Mlargereward = 73.20; Msmallreward = 51.23; t(118.81) = −5.75,
p < .001; see Figure W4 in Web Appendix C), supporting
H4.3 However, referral likelihood in the large public reward
condition still is lower than in the no-reward condition
(Mnoreward = 81.64; Mlargereward = 73.20; t(81.82) = 2.76,
p < .001). In the less innovative condition, a small reward
slightly increases referral likelihood (Mnoreward = 61.18;
Msmallreward = 69.68; t(63) = −1.88, p = .06; Figure W4). We
also find an increase from the no-reward to the large public
reward condition (Mnoreward = 61.68; Mlargereward = 81.79;
t(43.05) = −5.41, p < .05), as well as from the small to large
reward conditions (Msmallreward = 69.68; Mlargereward = 81.79;
t(46.08) = −4.01, p < .05).
Finally, we examined the conditional indirect effects.
Dummy 1 contrasts the indirect effects in the small versus
no-reward conditions, and Dummy 2 compares the indi-
rect effects in the large versus no-reward conditions. The
moderated mediation indices reveal that the indirect ef-
fects in the small public reward condition (b = −7.16,
SE = 2.09, 95% CI = [−11.73, −3.55]) and the large public
reward condition (b = −7.18, SE = 2.06, 95% CI = [−11.63,
−3.71]) decrease relative to the no-reward condition. As
expected, indirect effects indicate that expected self-
enhancement mediates the effect of innovativeness on re-
ferral likelihood in the no-reward (b = 8.67, SE = 1.77,
95% CI = [5.43, 12.39]) but not in the small reward (b =
1.51, SE = 1.26, 95% CI = [−.99, 4.05]) or large reward
conditions (b = 1.49, SE = 1.31, 95% CI = [−1.02,
4.14]).4 These findings are consistent with our reasoning
that referral rewards undermine customers’ motivation to
self-enhance through referrals but that large rewards can
compensate for the loss of motivation and increase refer-
ral likelihood, compared with a small reward.
Discussion
Participants’ referral likelihood for more innovative services
decreases in the presence of small public referral rewards rel-
ative to no reward, but with Study 4, we show that this detri-
mental effect depends on the reward size. In line with the
3 Our results reveal a U-shaped effect with regard to more innovative offer-
ings: With no referral reward, customers’ referral likelihood is high; with a
small referral reward, referral likelihood decreases (vs. no-reward condition);
and with a large referral reward, referral likelihood increases again (vs. no-
reward condition).
4 A pairwise comparison of the indirect effects in the small and large reward
conditions shows that the indirect effect in the small reward condition is not
significantly different from the indirect effect in the large reward condition
(b = −.02, SE = 1.80, 95% CI = [−3.66, −3.59]).
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rationale for H4, large public rewards can attenuate the nega-
tive effects; compared with small ones, large referral rewards
increase referral likelihood, though this likelihood still is
higher in the no-reward condition than in the large reward
condition. Thus, it appears difficult for firms to increase refer-
ral likelihood when customers are already motivated to rec-
ommend an innovative offering. Our results also support the
reinforcing effect of increasing reward sizes for less innova-
tive services.
Study 5: Moderating role of reward scheme
In Study 5, we test another managerially relevant moderator of
the detrimental effect of public referral rewards: varying re-
ward schemes. Rewarding both recommenders and referral
recipients (vs. only the recommender) may attenuate the det-
rimental effect of public referral rewards.
Moderating role of reward scheme
Different types of rewards and reward schemes exert unique
impacts, depending on the perceptions evoked (Dur et al.
2010). Some incentives do not undermine motivation or be-
havior, such as verbal rewards (Deci et al. 1999), while others
have neutral or positive effects on behaviors (Lacetera et al.
2012). Such varying effects are due to individuals’ percep-
tions of the rewards relative to their initial needs (Deci et al.
1999). If a reward conflicts with these needs, individuals may
feel directed by external forces, decreasing motivation and
behavior.
Thus, we propose that a reward allocation scheme affects
recommenders’ motivation to refer. In practice, most firms
offer a reward only to the recommender, but some firms split
it between the parties. We adopt Ryu and Feick’s (2007) ter-
minology describing Breward-me^ (only recommender gets
reward) and Breward-both^ (both recommender and referral
recipients get rewarded) schemes. Reward-me and reward-
Table 7 Moderated mediation results, Study 4
Consequences
Expected self-enhancement (ES) Referral likelihood (RL)
Antecedents Coefficient SE p 95% CI Coefficient SE p 95% CI
Service innovativeness (SI) 1.44 .21 < .001 [1.02, 1.86] 11.59 3.84 < .01 [4.05, 19.15]
Expected self-enhancement (ES) – – – – 6.03 .97 < .001 [4.12, 7.94]
Public referral reward
Dummy 1 (small vs. no reward) .09 .25 > .05 [−.39, .59] 7.47 4.17 =.07 [−.74, 15.67]
Dummy 2 (large vs. no reward) −.11 .22 > .05 [−.54, .32] 21.17 3.64 < .001 [14.01, 28.34]
SI × Public referral reward
SI × Dummy 1 −1.18 .30 < .001 [−1.78, −.59] −31.42 5.19 < .001 [−41.63, −21.20]
SI × Dummy 2 −1.19 .29 < .001 [−1.76, −.62] −21.93 4.41 < .001 [−31.71, −12.15]
Product involvement .08 .04 < .05 [.01, .15] .09 .63 > .05 [−1.15, 1.33]
CRP proneness −.01 .04 > .05 [−.10, .07] −.12 .73 > .05 [−1.55, 1.31]
R2 = .25
F (7, 297) = 13.86, p < .001
R2 = .40
F (8, 296) = 25.12, p < .001
Conditional direct effects of SI at values of the reward
Public referral reward Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI
No reward 1.44 .21 < .001 [1.02, 1.86] 11.59 3.84 < .01 [4.05, 19.15]
Small reward .25 .21 > .05 [−.17, .67] −19.82 3.58 < .001 [−26.87, −12.77]
Large reward .24 .19 > .05 [−.14, .63] −10.33 3.28 < .01 [−16.79, −3.88]
Conditional indirect effects of SI via ES on RL at values of the reward
Public referral reward Coefficient Boot SE 95% CI
No reward 8.67 1.77 [5.43, 12.39]
Small reward 1.51 1.26 [−.99, 4.05]
Large reward 1.49 1.31 [−1.02, 4.14]
Index of moderated mediation
Dummy 1 (small vs. no reward) −7.16 2.09 [−11.73, −3.55]
Dummy 2 (large vs. no reward) −7.18 2.06 [−11.63, −3.71]
Coefficient = unstandardized regression coefficients; Dummy 1 contrasts the small reward and no-reward conditions; Dummy 2 compares the large
reward and no-reward conditions
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both schemes differ conceptually in the economic benefits
received, such that the former assigns the recommender the
full economic benefit of the recommendation, but the latter
grants referral recipients part of the reward (usually 50%).
These schemes also differ relative to the degree to which they
affirm people’s initial needs and goals and thus their relative
contributions to a recommender’s self-enhancement goals.
Thus, with a public reward-me scheme, recommenders may
perceive themselves as self-interested and driven by economic
benefits, reducing internal satisfaction and positive self-
esteem (Andreoni 1990), conflicting with motivations to
self-enhance with the referral. Thus, public referral rewards
in a reward-me scheme may not encourage referrals.
In contrast, in public reward-both schemes, the referral re-
cipient receives some of the reward, so recommenders feel
they are helping the recipient make a good decision and
obtain money. Ryu and Feick (2007) show that rewarding
both parties reduces the perceived social costs of a recommen-
dation. Public reward-both schemes (vs. public reward-me
schemes) thus offer recommenders room to view their referral
behavior as compatible with their self-enhancement needs,
reducing their negative effect.
H5a: With a reward-both (vs. reward-me) scheme, the neg-
ative effect of public referral rewards on referral like-
lihood for more innovative products and services is
attenuated.
H5b: With a reward-both (vs. reward-me) scheme, the neg-
ative effect of public referral rewards on the indirect
effect of innovativeness through expected self-
enhancement on referral likelihood is attenuated.
Participants, design, and procedure
We use a 3 (referral reward scheme: no reward vs. reward-
me vs. reward-both) × 2 (product innovativeness: less vs.
more) between-subjects design. A total of 337 participants
(51% women, Mage = 26.18 years) were recruited for this
study and randomly assigned to the conditions, using the
same approaches and incentives as in Study 4. Research
assistants approached potential participants over a two-
week period. In total, 64.3% of the people who verbally
agreed to participate actually completed the online study.
We employed the product scenario from Study 3, with the
same fictitious brand (Smart Trolley) and innovativeness
manipulation, but we added a reward scheme manipula-
tion. The firm again reportedly informed participants via
email that it had launched a CRP. In the reward-me con-
dition, participants read only that the recommender would
receive a referral reward of €30 (~$36; 15% of the prod-
uct price), while the reward-both condition indicated that
both parties would receive €15 (~$18) each. In both cases,
the recipient needed to provide the recommender’s name
and email address when purchasing the suitcase. We did
not include this information in the no-reward condition.
Measures
We used the measures from Study 4. For the check of the
reward scheme manipulation, we asked participants to indi-
cate who received the referral reward (only recommender or
both recommender and referral recipient). Two realism checks
(Darley and Lim 1993) confirmed the realism of our experi-
mental setting (M = 5.02, SD = 1.38).
Results
Manipulation checks The manipulation of product innovative-
ness was successful. However, three participants failed the
check of the implemented reward scheme and were excluded,
leaving a final sample of 334 participants (see Web Appendix
E for detailed manipulation checks).
Hypotheses tests We conducted a moderated mediation
analysis (Hayes 2013; Model 8; bootstrapped with 5000
draws), with innovativeness (0 = less innovative; 1 = more
innovative) as the independent variable, referral reward
(0 = no reward; 1 = reward me; 2 = reward both) as moder-
ator, expected self-enhancement as mediator, referral like-
lihood as the dependent variable, and product involvement
and CRP proneness as covariates. We created two dummy
variables: Dummy 1 contrasts the reward-me and no-
reward conditions, and Dummy 2 compares the reward-
both and no-reward conditions (the reference category).
Results appear in Table 8.
Innovativeness exerts a positive direct effect on referral
likelihood when no reward is offered (b = 10.42, SE = 4.09,
p < .05, 95% CI = [2.37, 18.47]) and a negative direct effect
when the reward is offered only to the recommender (b =
−25.19, SE = 3.27, p < .001, 95% CI = [−31.62, −18.76]). In
support of H5a, we find a positive direct effect of innovative-
ness on referral likelihood when the reward is provided to
both the recommender and the referral recipient (b = 9.14,
SE = 3.54, p < .05, 95% CI = [2.17, 16.11]). For more inno-
vative products, rewarding both the recommender and the
recipient even increases referral likelihood compared with
the no-reward condition (Mnoreward = 78.60; Mrewardboth =
87.17; t(108) = −3.22, p < .01), but rewarding only the recom-
mender decreases this likelihood relative to the no-reward
condition (Mnoreward = 78.60; Mrewardme = 47.73; t(90.57) =
7.37, p < .001; see Figure W5 in Web Appendix C).
Referral likelihood also is higher in the reward-both condition
than in the reward-me condition (Mrewardboth = 87.17;
Mrewardme = 47.73; t(76.02) = −10.13, p < .001). The negative
effect of public referral rewards thus is attenuated in the
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reward-both condition, in support of H5a. In the less innova-
tive condition, the mean contrasts reveal differences between
the no-reward and reward-me conditions (Mnoreward = 55.31;
Mrewardme = 71.72; t(85.34) = −4.76, p < .001) and between
the no-reward and reward-both conditions (Mnoreward =
55.31; Mrewardboth = 69.39; t(105) = −3.70, p < .001). The dif-
ference between the reward-me and reward-both conditions is
not significant (Mrewardme = 71.72; Mrewardboth = 69.39;
t(118) = .74, p > .05).
To test H5b, we examine the conditional indirect effects
of innovativeness through expected self-enhancement on
referral likelihood, contingent on the public reward (no
reward vs. reward-me vs. reward-both). The indices of
the moderated mediation refer to the differences between
the conditional indirect effects. The indirect effect in the
reward-me condition decreases relative to the no-reward
condition (b = −9.84, SE = 2.45, 95% CI = [−15.16,
−5.52]), but in the reward-both condition, the indirect
effect is not different from that in the no-reward condition
(b = −2.88, SE = 1.67, 95% CI = [−6.47, .10]). As we sug-
gest in H5b, expected self-enhancement mediates the effect
of innovativeness on referral likelihood in the no-reward
(b = 11.58, SE = 2.48, 95% CI = [6.95, 16.69]) and reward-
both (b = 8.69, SE = 1.93, 95% CI = [5.25, 12.87]) condi-
tions but not in the reward-me condition (b = 1.74, SE =
1.17, 95% CI = [−.48, 4.16]). The results reveal partial me-
diation, because the direct effect of innovativeness on re-
ferral likelihood is significant in the no-reward (b = 10.42,
SE = 4.09, p < .05, 95% CI = [2.37, 18.47]) and reward-
both (b = 9.14, SE = 3.54, p < .05, 95% CI = [2.17, 16.11])
conditions.
Discussion
Study 5 reveals an important and managerially relevant
boundary condition. The detrimental effect of public referral
Table 8 Moderated mediation results, Study 5
Consequences
Expected self-enhancement (ES) Referral likelihood (RL)
Antecedents Coefficient SE p 95% CI Coefficient SE p 95% CI
Product innovativeness (PI) 1.81 .18 < .001 [1.45, 2.17] 10.42 4.09 < .05 [2.37, 18.47]
Expected self-enhancement (ES) – – – – 6.39 1.09 < .001 [4.26, 8.53]
Public referral reward
Dummy 1 (reward-me vs. no reward) −.04 .17 > .05 [−.38, .31] 15.48 3.42 < .001 [8.75, 22.21]
Dummy 2 (reward-both vs. no reward) .37 .18 < .05 [.02, .72] 9.77 3.51 < .01 [2.87, 16.67]
PI × Referral reward
PI × Dummy 1 −1.54 .25 < .001 [−2.03, −1.05] −35.61 5.15 < .001 [−45.74, −25.49]
PI × Dummy 2 −.45 .25 = .07 [−.94, .03] −1.28 4.85 > .05 [−10.83, 8.27]
Product involvement .10 .04 < .01 [.03, .17] 1.18 .73 > .05 [−.25, 2.62]
CRP proneness .08 .04 < .05 [.01, .15] .35 .72 > .05 [−1.06, 1.77]
R2 = .46
F (7, 326) = 40.05, p < .001
R2 = .42
F (8, 325) = 29.46, p < .001
Conditional direct effects of PI at values of the reward
Public referral reward Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI Coefficient Boot SE p 95% CI
No reward 1.81 .18 < .001 [1.45, 2.17] 10.42 4.09 < .05 [2.37, 18.47]
Reward me .27 .17 > .05 [−.06, .59] −25.19 3.27 < .001 [−31.62, −18.76]
Reward both 1.36 .16 < .001 [1.04, 1.68] 9.14 3.54 < .05 [2.17, 16.11]
Conditional indirect effects of PI via ES on RL at values of the reward
Public referral reward Coefficient Boot SE 95% CI
No reward 11.58 2.48 [6.95, 16.69]
Reward me 1.74 1.17 [−.48, 4.16]
Reward both 8.69 1.93 [5.25, 12.87]
Index of moderated mediation
Dummy 1 (reward-me vs. no reward) −9.84 2.45 [−15.16, −5.52]
Dummy 2 (reward-both vs. no reward) −2.88 1.67 [−6.47, .10]
Coefficient = unstandardized regression coefficients; Dummy 1 contrasts the reward-me and no-reward conditions; Dummy 2 compares the reward-both
and no-reward conditions
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rewards on referral likelihood for more innovative offerings is
mitigated by rewarding both parties. Rewarding both parties
offers participants more room to align their incentivized refer-
ral behavior with their self-enhancement needs (e.g., being
helpful and generous), resulting in increased referral likeli-
hood. However, we find no difference between rewarding
only the recommender and rewarding both for less innovative
products.
Conclusion and implications
Although CRPs are widely viewed as effective relationship
tools that can facilitate referral behavior and increase customer
bases (Ryu and Feick 2007), our research qualifies these find-
ings by showing that public referral rewards effectively boost
customer acquisition only for less innovative offerings. For
more innovative offerings, customers exhibit a high natural,
unrewarded referral likelihood, and offering a public referral
reward decreases this likelihood.With one field study and four
experiments, we examine this negative effect and identify
managerially relevant boundary conditions, related to the re-
ward’s visibility, size, and scheme.
Theoretical implications
Finding ways to increase the customer base for more innova-
tive offerings constitutes a central marketing challenge (Peres
et al. 2010). Prior research highlights the importance of cus-
tomer referrals but also notes the high costs of firm-initiated
strategies to encourage them (e.g., Lee and O’Connor 2003).
We also show that marketing programs aimed at stimulating
customers’ recommendations through referral rewards can
backfire and hinder innovation success; in particular, rewards
can interfere with referral behavior, which is key for new
product diffusion. With this study, we demonstrate that public
CRPs for more innovative offerings can reduce referral
behavior.
While prior research indicates that CRPs perform better
than other promotional tools (e.g., Kornish and Li 2010),
we illustrate the differential effects of public referral re-
wards, including their unintended, potentially negative ef-
fects. In particular, CRP effectiveness depends on the type
of offering, with rewards for less innovative offerings in-
creasing referral likelihood which is not true for more
innovative offerings.
In addition to identifying the types of offerings, we
uncover several boundary conditions. Specifically, the
detrimental effect depends on reward visibility, such that
private referral rewards enable recommenders to achieve
self-enhancement while also attenuating the negative ef-
fect of the reward on referral likelihood. Increasing the
referral reward size also attenuates the negative effects
of public referral rewards for more innovative offerings
and increases referral likelihood for less innovative offer-
ings. Implementing a public reward-both scheme (vs. a
public reward-me scheme) allows recommenders room
to interpret their behavior compatibly with their self-
enhancement needs, reducing rewards’ detrimental ef-
fects. Rewarding both parties increases recommenders’
referral likelihood for more innovative offerings, com-
pared with both the no-reward and reward-me conditions.
However, we find no difference between rewarding only
the recommender and rewarding both for less innovative
offerings.
The results also indicate the importance of recognizing
that motivations to self-enhance and financial rewards in-
teract to influence referral likelihood for more innovative
offerings. We find that extrinsic stimuli, such as referral
rewards, can undermine motivational states, such as need
to self-enhance. We also rule out several alternative expla-
nations for these detrimental effects, including intention to
help or perceived social costs. By presenting a detailed
analysis of the underlying process producing this negative
effect of rewards on referral behavior, we advance research
on the potential negative effects of incentives overall
(Ariely et al. 2009).
Managerial implications
Managers who are considering whether to implement
CRPs can rely on several insights from our research.
First, they should recognize that a base level of referral
potential already exists for more innovative offerings.
Customers like to recommend such offerings to others,
because it serves their psychological self-interest.
Attempts to harness customer advocacy through financial
rewards appear to erode, rather than increase, their will-
ingness to refer these more innovative products and ser-
vices, which represents a note of caution for managers.
Customer referrals might be a critical success factor for
innovative launches (Kawakami and Parry 2013), but con-
trary to the expectations and insights for less innovative
offerings, public referral rewards for more innovative of-
ferings can impede their diffusion. Managers must take
care when implementing public CRPs, especially financial
ones, for more innovative offerings. This is not to suggest
that firms should avoid public CRPs completely; they are
effective for less innovative offerings. Rather, managers
introducing highly novel offerings might consider devot-
ing fewer marketing resources to CRPs and target new
customers in other ways.
Second, if firms decide to offer public financial rewards,
they should offer larger incentives rather than smaller ones.
Study 4 results suggest public rewards that match the purchase
price of the innovative offering can mitigate the detrimental
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effects on referral behavior. Regardless of innovativeness
levels, managers should study the curve progression between
reward size and referral likelihood to determine an optimal
reward size. For example, if the curve exhibits a concave
function, managers can anticipate decreasing returns on their
investments when offering greater financial rewards.
However, offering no rewards and relying on customers’ nat-
ural drive to recommend more innovative offerings appears
promising as an acquisition strategy.
Third, whether reward schemes benefit both parties consti-
tutes an important and managerially relevant boundary condi-
tion. Managers who seek new customers for their more inno-
vative offerings should consider offering financial rewards to
both parties in the dyad, thereby increasing the likelihood of a
referral (Study 5). Notably though, we find no difference in
referral likelihood across these schemes for less innovative
offerings.
Fourth, we show that marketing managers can avoid some
detrimental effects of referral rewards for innovative offerings
by not disclosing the reward to recipients. However, we cau-
tion against this approach, because of ethical concerns about
the practice. Combining these insights, managers can better
predict when referral rewards are more likely to exert negative
effects, as well as when and how they might positively influ-
ence customer behavior.
Limitations and further research
Our research focuses solely on recommenders and their refer-
ral likelihood. For CRPs to be effective, a high referral likeli-
hood on the recommender side must combine with the referral
recipient’s receptivity to the recommendation. Examining re-
ferral recipients’ perceptions of and reactions to rewards was
beyond the scope of the current research; further research
might examine this question at the dyad level. For example,
financial rewards for referrals might affect perceived trustwor-
thiness of the recommendation for more innovative offerings,
thus influencing referral recipients’ intentions to adopt the
recommended offering.
The use of fictitious brands here did not allow us to study
the potential influence of brand strength on referral behavior.
With Ryu and Feick (2007) finding that strong brands offer
higher quality and value than weak brands, addressing brand
strength into this topic would be useful.
Finally, other types of rewards (e.g., non-monetary in-
centives) might not undermine referral motivation as
much as financial rewards (Heymann and Ariely 2004).
However, we know of no research that investigates the
effects of non-monetary referral rewards on referral be-
havior for more innovative offerings. Firms offer a wide
range of referral reward types, such as in-kind rewards
and redeemable points, suggesting a need for further re-
search into this topic.
Appendix
Scale items and measurement properties
Perceived innovativeness (adapted from Stock 2011).
(Cronbach’s α = .87 [Study 1]; .87 [Pretest Study 2]; .89
[Study 2]; .82 [Pretest Study 3]; .93 [Study 3]; .90 [Study 4];
.88 [Study 5])
& I think the [product/service] is innovative compared to
other [products/services].
& The [product/service] differs from competing [products/
services] in the market.
& The [product/service] can be characterized as being very
new to the market.
Expected satisfaction of the need for self-enhancement
(adapted from Alexandrov et al. 2013)
(Cronbach’s α = .95 [Study 1]; .71 [Pretest Study 2]; .92
[Study 2]; .90 [Pretest Study 3]; .93 [Study 3]; .80 [Study 4];
.80 [Study 5])
If I recommend this [product/service] in a conversation…
& It will create the impression that I am an interesting
person.
& I will receive positive feedback from others.
& I will create a positive impression on others.
Intention to help others (adapted from Alexandrov et al. 2013)
(Cronbach’s α = .86 [Study 2])
& When I recommend [firm] I help the referral recipient to
be a better customer.
& I help the referral recipient to get the information she/he
needs, when I recommend [firm].
& When I recommend [firm] I help the referral recipient to
form an opinion about the brand.
Perceived social costs (adapted from Jin and Huang 2014).
(Cronbach’s α =. 87 [Study 2])
& The referral recipient will think that you are betraying him/
her for your own benefit.
& You will become more estranged from the referral recipi-
ent after the recommendation.
& The referral recipient will think that you are helping him/
her. (R)
& The referral recipient will feel uncomfortable when I rec-
ommend [firm].
& The referral recipient will think that he/ she is being taken
advantage of by you.
Product involvement (adapted from Beatty and Talpade 1994).
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(Cronbach’s α = .74 [Study 1]; .78 [Study 2]; .74 [Study 3];
.90 [Study 4]; .87 [Study 5])
& In general I have a strong interest in [product category].
& [Product category] is very important to me.
& [Product category] matters a lot to me.
& I get bored when other people talk to me about [product
category]. (R)
Product satisfaction (adapted from De Wulf et al. 2001)
(Cronbach’s α = .96 [Study 1])
& I am satisfied with the product I last purchased at [name of
the online shop].
& Overall, I am happy with the product I last purchased at
[name of the online shop].
& Overall, my experiences with the product I last purchased
at [name of the online shop] are good.
CRP (= customer referral reward program) proneness
(adapted from Lichtenstein et al. 1990)
(Cronbach’s α = .93 [Study 2]; .93 [Study 3]; .82 [Study 4];
.81 [Study 5])
With a statement as to what CRPs are, the following state-
ments followed:
& Participating in CRPs makes me feel good.
& Beyond the referral reward I get, participating in CPRs
gives me a sense of joy.
& I enjoy participating in CRPs.
Perceived reward size (adapted from Ryu and Feick 2007).
(Cronbach’s α = .89 [Study 4])
& I think the referral reward is very attractive.
& I think the referral reward offered by [firm] is large.
Realism check (adapted from Darley and Lim 1993).
(Cronbach’s α = .88 [Study 2]; = .89 [Study 3]; = .84 [Study
4]; = .82 [Study 5])
& I could imagine a situation like this happening to me in
real life.
& I believe the situation was very realistic.
Referral likelihood (adapted from Ryu and Feick 2007).
Measured on a 100-point scale: 0% = certain not to recom-
mend the [product/service], 100% = certain to recommend
the [product/service].
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